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Case Review Essay

The Case of Baby M: Love's
Labor Lost
George P. Smith, II

An Expression of Love or
Common Sense?
It has been estimated that in the
United States some twenty thousand
babies are born through artificial insemination by donor (AID) each
year.' With the startling new advances in reproductive technology,
or what has been termed "collaborative conception,"3 it is now possible for a child to have up to five
"parents": an egg donor, a sperm
donor, a surrogate mother who gestates the fetus, and the couple who
actually raises the child 5 What we
now face, then-not only in considering the New Jersey Supreme
Court's decision In re Baby M4 but
in the whole area of the "new" reproductive biology-is, in the words
'5
of a popular columnist, a "mess."
Interestingly, the enormity of
this complex, multiparent scenario--which seems to be on its way
to becoming a reality with Baby M
and its anticipated progeny-was
totally lost on Mary Beth Whitehead. "I just can't see how four people loving [Baby M],five people loving her, can hurt her," 6 she said recently. Ms. Whitehead's rather
simplistic response to this "love
scenario" was perhaps underscored
by an equally legerdemanic New
Jersey Supreme Court. The court
called upon the parties to let their
"undoubted love" and "good faith"

settle the vexatious issue of visitation "in the best interest of the
child." 7 To be effective, law must
operate within a rational structure
and not a vortex of sentimentality.8
More than love is needed to settle this dilemma; common sensedevoid of exaggerated emotionalism
and imbued with an appreciation of
hard facts and realities-is required.
For example, how will the court
draw up or supervise the complicated arrangements to share the
child, arrange visits with her, and
see that her needs are placed above
those of the party litigants? How
can the court gauge the attitudes of
Ms. Whitehead's two sons, aged
twelve and thirteen, toward their
new half-sister? To what extent will
Ms. Whitehead's divorce and her
new marriage to Mr. Gould confuse
Baby M and her sense of identity?
Will exposure to Ms. Whitehead's
parents add an unsettling dimension
to the child's "best interests"?
Finally, how will Baby M be affected by the legions of inquiring
journalists who will be following
this lead story over the years, as she
moves through childhood and into
the stresses of adolescence? The
ABC television network's recent
production of "Baby M" 9 will
surely be playing the rerun circuit as
Baby M Stern grows older, with updates on how she is relating to her
two sets of parents. Given Ms.
121

Whitehead's background and temperament, front-page news stories
about her "struggles" to visit her
child (and possibly to revise the custody decree) can be anticipated over
the years ahead-and this, all in the
"best interests" of the child! Instead
of promoting tranquility, the judiciary has agreed to preside over an
"obvious human muddle" that will
preserve the current "emotional
shambles" for years to come.' 0
ParentalFitness
The trial court did not find
Ms. Whitehead to be an "unfit
mother""; indeed, it recognized her
as a "good mother to her [two
previous] children."' Yet her numerous failings of character (i.e.,
domineering attitude, impulsiveness, dishonesty, selfishness, and
insensitivity),' 3 together with her financial instability, the modest employment opportunities of her husband, and his alcoholism, combined
to create a "vulnerable household.'" The court concluded that
in it "the prospects for a wholesome
independent psychological growth
and development would be at serious risk.' 5
Although the court acknowledged that Ms. Whitehead was capable of showing love and affection
for Baby M,' 6 this-in itself-was

insufficient to vitiate the weaknesses
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of the Whitehead household. As the
New Jersey Supreme Court concluded correctly, the application of
the best-interest test "boils down"
to a judgment call regarding the
"likely future happiness of a human
being."' 7
What I find disconcertinggiven the tone of this analysis by the
court--is the insistence that visitation rights should be considered for
Ms. Whitehead. Factors judged undesirable and a threat to Baby M's
"likely future happiness" when considering custody tights should also
be of importance when considering
visitation rights. The long-range influence and impact of Ms. Whitehead's contact with Baby M will be
devastating for the child's psychosocial development.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey appears to be mystically devoted
to the "sacredness" of biological
motherhood--without a dispassionate and objective examination of the
totality of the circumstances that
give rise to it and the "benefits" of
allowing it to continue and develop
through visitation.
Toward a New Right of
Familial Procurement
The courts have slighted or even refused to recognize the mental elements of procreation. Rather, they
consider the biology of reproduction
dominant over the psychology and,
indeed, have traditionally given little
consideration to the motivations of
initiating parents.' 8 Thus, as might
be expected, final decisions in surrogacy cases have failed to include accurate assessments of either the
child's best interests or of adequate
care for the child.' 9 Adequate care
should be but a complement to best
interests, not a separate standard.
With this approach, the "mentally
conceiving" (or "initiating") parents
would be recognized, of necessity, as
holding the priority of right to raise
the child,' 0 without extra-custodial
visitation rights from the birthing
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mother. Admittedly, before this approach could be validated, a new
right of "familial procurement"
would have to be structured. Judicial protection of the choice to
procreate" would be recognized as
but a logical analogue to the "recognition of a fundamental interest in
procuring assistance to overcome a
personal inability to procreate.""
Absent the wide acceptance of this
new or coordinate right, the bestinterests test must, however, remain
controlling.
Determining Best Interests
How should the test for the best interests of the child be developed
and-for that matter-applied? Obviously, the test is fact-sensitive and
defies a uniform standard of application. Yet a core set of factors may
reasonably be employed to test the
extent to which the best interests of
the disputed child would be ad-s
vanced in a given environment."
These are: the economic, physical,
mental, social, psychological, or ethical harm that would befall or
threaten the infant in either family;
the social values that would be reinforced or impaired with placement
of the child in either family; the suitability of the character of the opposing parties; the economic or social
burden that custodial or visitation
rights would impose on the parties
and on the infant; and the practicability of the ultimate action (i.e., the
ease of enforcement if the parties
are
in different jurisdictions).' 4
Middle-class standards should
never be considered a handicap or a
negative value for a court to consider in determining who can give a
child the most adequate care, which,
in turn, will ensure that its best interests are advanced. Parents with
good educations, attractive jobs,
and financial security should-in the
normal course of affairs--be able to
afford a child better care and better
opportunities for growth than
122

would a less advantaged family. It
really is that simple.
If the goal of law is to maximize
the welfare or utility of all human
beings, a prima facie case could be
posited for according children some
measure of legal protection against
their parents or those who would assert custodial rights.' 5 Efficiency,
emotional stability, and security are
minimal investments for a child's
development.6
A Judicial Quandary
New Jersey Chief Justice Wilentz expressed fear about the long-term
negative psychological impact of
surrogacy on the child, the natural
mother, the natural father, and the
adoptive mother. His solution was
to hold surrogacy contracts for
money invalid and unenforceable.
Yet by condoning visitation rights
for Ms. Whitehead, the chief justice
has given the traumas permission to
build. The Stems' parental authority
will surely be undermined, and the
stability and security the child so
desperately needs will be jeopar7
dized.'
It was for these very reasons that
Baby M's guardian ad litemrelying on the testimony of a number of her experts-recommended
that Ms. Whitehead's visitation
rights be suspended, with a reevaluation after five years. Subsequently, without further expert testimony, she revised her position and
argued that visitation should be suspended until the child attains majority. The court opined that the testimony of the guardian's experts was
undeveloped on the issue of visitation, "really derivative of their views
about custody and termination."
Thus it decided that the kind, the
conditions if any, and the circumstances of visitation should be determined on remand.'
Seeking a Unity of
Understanding
The New Jersey Supreme Court
failed to consider surrogacy, the ter-
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mination of parental rights, and custody and visitation rights as complementary or even inextricably linked
issues. Rather than combining the
testimony and other evidentiary
proofs into one unified approach to
the problem, the court segmented
the proofs and did not build upon
them. Such a synthesis would have
avoided the confusion surrounding a
"new" application and development
of the best-interest test for visitation
rights.
The child's adequate care and
best interest are the paramount issues. There should be a unity of understanding on this point. Children
have an interest not only in their legitimation (whether or not the surrogacy is validated) but also in the
extent of their parents' custody and
visitation rights. Courts must seek,
when presented with cases such as
Baby M, to achieve the proper balance of competing interests among
the parents and the child. While it
may well be "desirable for the child
to have contact with both parents,"' 9 the issue must be settled by
application of the standard of reasonableness--not by a "standard"
of emotionalism. If the court had
employed this principle, it would
have upheld Dr. Stem's adoption of
Baby M, not overturned it.
My argument is simple and
straightforward: the court should
have realized that the evidentiary
considerations and judicial analysis
it used in awarding custody to Mr.
Stern also supported the termination
of Ms. Whitehead's parental rights
altogether and the foreclosure of visitation until the child attained majority.
The court recognized the controlling mandate of the New Jersey
statutes that premise such drastic action on a showing of "forsaken parental obligation" and either a "continuous neglect or failure to perform
the natural and regular obligations
of care and support of a child."' 0

The caselaw shows that the health
and development of a child must be

at risk of serious impairment by a
continuation of the parental relationship before termination will be
ordered. 3 '
It is a common canon of statutory interpretation that statutes
should be construed liberally so as
to promote the ends of justice.3'
Here, justice clearly demands assurance that the child's health and development will not be jeopardized or
compromised. It is not an improper
crossover or linkage to urge the
courts to recognize this fundamental
ideal. They should endeavor to develop and apply uniformly the test
for the best interests of the child to
cases involving termination of parental rights, custody, visitation, and
the validity of surrogacy contracts.
The major-if not the sole-task
for contemporary judges is to avoid
the infusion of extra-constitutional
moral and politicalnorms into their
deliberations. Rather, they should
seek to translate the legislative morality of a questioned statute into a
practicalrules"-i.e., reasonable implementation of the best-interests
test. This should be the standard by
which pertinent statutes in this field
as well as general policy issues
should be determined by the courts.
There is an obvious need to
reform existing law in order--depending upon one's persuasion--to
accommodate or to forbid artificial
conception. More fundamental,
however, is the need to equip the legal system to deal adequately now
and in the future with the vexatious
human problems entailed by the
new reproductive technologies."
Structuring a New
Framework
Since surrogate parenting is the biological counterpart of artificial insemination by donor (AID)-with
the surrogate being thus equivalent
to the semen donor-one might
hope that the current laws controlling AID would provide a basis for
regulating parenthood arrange-

ments in surrogacy. Such is not the
case, however. 3 5
Existing statutory distinctions allow AID donors to be paid for
sperm but deny payment to surrogate mothers. They thus may well be
challenged as an unconstitutional
denial of equal protection.' Further
distinction might be found in separating cases
involving surrogating practices
when there will be no genotypical relationship between the
child and the individuals seeking its procreation and those
cases in which a womb is
"borrowed" to carry a child
conceived by persons who will
be the biological parents and
who propose to integrate fully
37
the child into their family.
Twenty-three jurisdictions currently prohibit financial compensation to surrogates, except for certain
specific expenses, under state adoption laws.3' A Michigan court has
ruled payment to a surrogate based
upon a contract to perform services
invalid, deeming it a contract to sell
a baby.3 9 The Kentucky Supreme
Court reached the opposite conclusion, based on constitutional
grounds. It reasoned that surrogacy
was not baby-selling, because the biological father had already established a legal relationship with the
child.40
Legislative Reforms
State legislatures are currently considering a number of proposals to
legalize and/or regulate surrogate
motherhood. 4' In its 1988 mid-year
meeting, the Family Law Section of
the American Bar Association approved a Model Surrogacy Act that
not only makes surrogacy contracts
enforceable but also destroys the
common-law presumption that the
woman who bears a child is its legal
mother. The model act approves a
range of payments to the surrogate
4
mother, from $7,5oo to $12,5oo. 1
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Outlawing surrogacy and creating stringent enforcement mechanisms would have the obvious effect
of forcing a powerful black market
to develop-particularly since the
process of becoming a surrogate
mother is not an exceptionally difficult one to master. A ban on surrogate motherhood in all forms would
also be difficult and distasteful to
enforce. Many enforcing agents
might find it awkward to exact a
penalty from a woman for becoming
a mother, or to impose a prison sentence on those who promoted the
pregnancy's advancement and implementation. Such measures would
be offensive to basic public policy,
which recognizes the family as the
bulwark of society."
A second approach would be for
states to structure a licensing procedure for surrogacy. Such a program
would seek to protect the health and
well-being of the child, together
with the safety of the surrogate. It
would define the contracting parents' rights and determine the extent
of their potential liabilities as well as
define the responsibilities of any intermediaries (doctors, lawyers, or
family friends). A licensing board
empowered to set, enforce, and implement standards could make any
necessary administrative decisions.4
Any comprehensive regulatory
approach should have as its goal the
greater protection of the children
born with the new reproductive
technologies. 45 Some have suggested
that nothing less than a new framework is necessary, in order to correct the growing incoherence of legal
mismatching by the courts that gives
every indication of worsening as
more and more "crafted,"46 factsensitive opinions are made.
The dilemma we face is that a
legislative framework for surrogacy
may cause the number of such arrangements to increase alarmingly,
with the risk that-absent statutory
organization of the area--our chief
goal of protecting the children will

suffer. Because of the political volatility of the issue, proposals to validate surrogacy contracts or to provide for their execution by legisla4
tion may meet strong opposition. '

In the absence of a controlling
statute, the courts should take an expansive view of the elements of adequate care as a complement to
maintenance and promotion of the
child's best interests and furthermore, when possible, steer clear of
making custodial decisions on the
basis of contract theory.4S
Toward a Delicate Balance
Although I find nothing abhorrent
about the development of legislation
validating surrogate contracts, I find
greater comfort in having the courts
seek a reasonable balance of competing interests in determining
where the disputed child's best interests truly lie. The framework for
principled decision-making that I
have posited is more adaptable to
the needs of equity than is contract
law. Granted, a contract is the memorialization of the participating
parties' intent and their operative
standard of reasonableness. Yet
flexibility must be assured, which
can only be accomplished by applying the test for the best interests of
the child, guided by rationality instead of emotionalism.
In the final analysis, the question
remains: How can we achieve a balance between the benefits that the
new reproductive technologies offer
infertile couples and the risks of
abuse inherent in the "solution"?
This problem can only be addressed
"when society decides what its values and objectives are in this troubling, yet promising area." 49
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